

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/PV.414

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COLLECTION

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND FOURTEENTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 22 May 1969, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. T. LAHODA

(Czechoslovakia)

GE.69-11172

69-35404

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. S.A. FRAZAO
Mr. C.A. de SOUZA e SILVA
Mr. L.F. PALMEIRA LAMPREIA

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. CHRISTOV
Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV
Mr. I. PEINIRDJIEV

Burma:

U KYAW MIN

Canada:

Mr. G. IGNATIEFF
Mr. J.R. MORDEN

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. T. LAHODA
Mr. V. SAFAR
Mr. J. STRUCKA

Ethiopia:

Mr. A. ZELLEKE

India:

Mr. M.A. HUSAIN
Mr. N. KRISHNAN
Mr. K.P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. R. CARACCILO
Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI
Mr. R. BORSARELLI
Mr. U. PESTALOZZA

Mexico:

Miss E. AGUIRRE
Mr. H. CARDENAS RODRIGUEZ

Nigeria:

Alhaji SULE KOLO
Mr. L.A. MALIKI

Poland:

Mr. K. ZYBILSKI
Mr. H. STEPOSZ
Mr. R. WLAZLO
Mr. S. DABROWA

Romania:

Mr. N. ECOBESCO
Mr. V. CONSTANTINESCO
Mr. V. TARZIORU

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL
Mr. A. EDELSTAM
Mr. U. ERICSSON
Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
Mr. O.A. GRINEVSKY
Mr. I.I. TCHEPROV
Mr. N.S. KISHILOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. H. KHALAF
Mr. O. SIRRY
Mr. E.S. EL REEDY
Mr. Y. RIZK

United Kingdom:

Mr. I.F. PORTER
Mr. W.N. HILLIER-FRY

United States of America:

Mr. A.S. FISHER
Mr. C. MATHIAS
Mr. C. GLEYSTEN
Mr. W. GIVAN

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (Czechoslovakia): I declare open the 414th plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.
2. Mr. FISHER (United States of America): The idea of an arms control agreement for the sea-bed is basically responsive to a technological fact of life: the fact that the environment of the sea-bed is becoming increasingly accessible to man. At the same time it may be said that if we succeed in arriving at an arms control agreement for the sea-bed we shall have added one more important element to the larger picture of international restraints on armaments which has been taking form.
3. Viewed as one more step in that all-important process, a sea-bed agreement appears as the logical follow-on to the Antarctic Treaty^{1/} and the outer space Treaty (General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI), annex), and indeed it would be analogous in many ways to those Treaties. It would be analogous in many ways but not in all ways, for the sea-bed is a unique environment, with its own special characteristics. Foremost among these, for our purposes, is the obvious but important fact that the sea-bed is coterminous with the sea itself, which has been used for offensive and defensive military action since almost the beginning of history. Hence the belief of the United States that, in the circumstances in which we are now living, total demilitarization of the sea-bed is scarcely practical or attainable.
4. We have studied intensively the elements which might comprise a successful arms control agreement for the sea-bed, as we have studied very carefully the views which have been put forward in this Committee. We believe that great progress has already been realized in approaching this complex subject, and that we have now reached the point where it is useful and appropriate to set forth our views in the form of a draft treaty.
5. From the statements that have been made here I believe we can all agree that there exists a desire on the part of all the members of this Committee to make progress rapidly towards preventing an arms race on the sea-bed and to arrive, if possible, at an agreement on this subject before the next session of the General Assembly. There have, however, been several suggestions as to how that goal can best be achieved. Some delegations have proposed a complete demilitarization of the sea-bed. That concept is embodied in the draft treaty submitted by the representative of the Soviet Union on 18 March (ENDC/240). There have been other suggestions. Some have

^{1/} United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 402, pp. 71 et seq.

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suggested a catalogue of the various types of installations which should be prohibited; others have suggested that specific exceptions should be written to permit certain defensive installations.

6. For its part the United States has attempted to make clear, in its statements of 25 March (ENDC/PV.397 paras. 37 et seq.) and 15 May (ENDC/PV.411, paras. 21 et seq.), its belief that the only practical way to prevent an arms race on the sea-bed would be an agreement banning the emplacement or fixing of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed. Such an agreement would remove the major threat to the peaceful uses of the sea-bed. At the same time it would reduce the verification problem to manageable proportions and would be consistent with the security interests of coastal States. Accordingly, on the instructions of the United States Government, we are submitting for the consideration of the Committee a draft treaty (ENDC/249) which would prohibit the emplacement or fixing of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor. I believe that draft has now been circulated to the members of the Committee. We are of the firm conviction that by adopting this approach we shall accomplish in the simplest and speediest manner our task of preventing the extension of the arms race to the sea-bed.

7. I should like now to discuss briefly the individual articles of our draft treaty.

8. The first paragraph of article I prohibits any party from emplanting or emplacing fixed nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on, within, or beneath the sea-bed and the ocean floor beyond a narrow band -- a band defined in article II -- adjacent to the coast of any State. The prohibition would also apply to fixed launching platforms associated with nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction whether or not a missile or a warhead containing a nuclear weapon or other weapon of mass destruction was actually in place. We believe that this is responsive to the thoughtful suggestions made by our Polish colleague (ENDC/406, paras. 11-31). The language of the prohibition goes to the heart of our greatest concern, namely, that the sea-bed might be used as an area for the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction. Paragraph 2 of article I obligates each party to refrain from causing, encouraging, facilitating or in any way participating in the activities prohibited by the first paragraph of article I.

9. Article II deals with the limits of the narrow band mentioned in article I and with the question of territorial sea claims. Paragraph 1 of article II establishes the boundary of the narrow band. In deciding on the width of the band which the United States would propose, we have taken into consideration two views

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expressed by nearly all the members of this Committee who have spoken on the subject. The first is that the prohibition should extend to the maximum practical area of the sea-bed. The second is that the limits establishing the area in which the prohibition would apply should be separated from such complex issues as territorial sea claims and national jurisdiction. This view concerning separation has been given express recognition in paragraph 3 of article II. We believe that, once that separation has been expressly recognized, setting the width of the narrow band at three miles, as is done in paragraph 1 of article II, responds to both of those views.

10. First of all, as compared with the twelve-mile width, it would add roughly 2 million square miles of sea-bed to the area of prohibition. That is an area in which, it might be pointed out, the temptation to extend the nuclear arms race might be very great, because of its proximity to the shore. Secondly, by placing the outer limit of the narrow band at three miles we have avoided the complex questions associated with the extent of national jurisdiction. Moreover, it takes care of the concern expressed by several delegations over the status of the zone that would exist between a twelve-mile limit, for example, and the outer limits of territorial waters that were less than twelve miles. Under the draft treaty we are now presenting no such zone would exist, since the three-mile limit represents, I believe, the narrowest claim for a territorial sea.

11. Paragraph 2 of article II, at present blank, would define the baselines from which the outer limit of the three-mile narrow band would be measured. We believe such definitions of baselines are necessary in view of existing claims to certain marginal seas as internal waters. In order to establish equitable boundaries and balanced obligations for all parties to the treaty, agreement will need to be worked out on how such marginal seas are to be treated. In this connexion it might be desirable and practical to draw on an existing international agreement dealing with the establishment of baselines. For its part the United States is prepared to accept baselines drawn in a manner specified in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone^{2/} if agreement can be reached on the appropriate interpretations of that Treaty as applied to the relevant areas in question.

^{2/} United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 516, pp. 205 et seq.

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12. Article III of the draft treaty being submitted today deals with verification. As is well known, the United States has consistently supported the principle of adequate verification for all arms control agreements. The question arises as to what constitutes "adequate" verification of this particular measure in the light of our present and developing capabilities. That is not an easy question to answer, particularly in view of the immense technical problems associated with operating in the hostile environment of the sea-bed. However, if we can ensure that the parties to the treaty remain free to observe the activities of other States on the sea-bed and ocean floor, we are confident that such observation will provide appropriate verification for the purposes of the treaty. One reason for this is our feeling that if a party were to violate this treaty it would not limit itself to the installation of a single weapon. If it were to violate the treaty, it would doubtless do so on a large scale.

13. Paragraph 1 of article III of our draft treaty therefore ensures the right of observation of activities on the sea-bed and ocean floor to be carried on in a way which does not interfere with the activities of States on the sea-bed or otherwise infringe rights recognized under international law, including freedom of the high seas. Paragraph 1 of article III also provides that in the event such observation does not in any particular case suffice to eliminate questions regarding fulfilment of the provisions of the treaty, the parties undertake to consult and to co-operate in endeavouring to resolve the questions.

14. I am aware that the draft treaty placed before this Conference by the Soviet representative contains the flat provision that all installations and structures on the sea-bed shall be open for verification, a provision which is qualified only by the requirement of reciprocity. Comparisons between the Soviet draft treaty and our draft treaty will be inevitable. Therefore, I should like to address myself to the Soviet draft treaty, in no spirit of contentiousness but in a spirit of carrying on the deliberations of this Committee, as we must. The verification provision of the Soviet draft treaty is of course modelled on the provision in the outer space Treaty for verifying that there are no military installations on the moon or other celestial bodies. But an attempt to transplant, so to speak, a provision applicable to the moon -- where all claims of national jurisdiction have been renounced -- to the sea-bed, where there are many existing claims of national jurisdiction and a growing number of scientific and commercial uses, raises many difficult political and legal questions. In addition, there would be an immense technical problem in living up to such an unqualified verification provision in the hostile environment of the sea-bed. For

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example, the entry of an observer into any installation on the sea-bed, if it is at great depth and, as a result, at great pressure, would be both difficult and dangerous. The solution of that problem might require special equipment designed for each particular type of installation. The entry into even one installation, in addition to being hazardous, could take lengthy preparation and be extremely expensive. In order to avoid complicated efforts to establish any such procedure at this time, the United States proposes a simple and straightforward verification system based on observation and consultation to resolve any questions as to compliance with the treaty which the observation might have raised.

15. The United States believes such a system would be workable. In my statement on 15 May I set forth the reasons why the emplacing or fixing on the ocean floor of an installation that was capable of serving as part of an effective weapons system involving nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction would be unlikely to escape the attention of other maritime Powers (ENDC/PV.411, para. 25). If other maritime Powers became aware of this activity, as we believe they would, and if they suspected a violation of the treaty, they could act under the observation provision of article III of the United States draft. Let us consider the role this observation could play in verifying compliance with the treaty.

16. If the installation had a configuration which could contain a missile for delivery of a nuclear weapon, and apertures or hatches from which such a missile could be launched, this would be observable. If the installation had communications facilities for a sophisticated command and control system, this might also be observed. And if the installation contained an airlock, designed to permit entry of personnel, or contained large detachable parts, which could be detached for maintenance, this too could be observed.

17. All the questions raised by those observations would have to be resolved by the consultation provided for in article III, and the other party would be committed to co-operate to resolve them. I can assure the Committee that if the United States were to request consultations under this article, it would not propose to let the consultations drop until its questions were satisfactorily resolved.

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18. I might add that this procedure for verification, involving observation and consultation, would be available to all parties to the treaty.

19. In our view, international consultation would thus play an important role in the treaty's provision for verification without the need for a special international verification organization, which we would consider as both premature and wasteful of resources.

20. The United States believes that the verification procedure set forth in article III of this draft, which I have just described, is consonant with our present and developing capability to verify activities on the sea-bed. We also believe that it is appropriate to protect against the threat that we have reason to be concerned about both now and in the immediate future. But the draft treaty we are presenting today provides that five years after its entry into force a review conference will be held. If technological and other developments warrant revision of the verification provision of the treaty, they can be considered at that time. So that there can be no doubt as to our intentions in this regard, paragraph 2 of article III expressly provides that the review conference shall consider whether any additional rights or procedures of verification should be established.

21. Article IV provides for amendments to the treaty, and is identical in language to article XV of the outer space Treaty.

22. Article V of the draft treaty we are presenting today provides for the review conference which I have already mentioned. The conference would meet here in Geneva five years after the entry into force of the treaty, and review the operation of the treaty with a view to ensuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the treaty are being realized. The provision for the review conference has been included because the United States considers the treaty as an initial undertaking in a complex environment. Accordingly, the United States believes that all parties will have an interest in ensuring that there is an opportunity to consider the effect of technological or other changes on the operation of the treaty. Article V also provides that the review conference shall determine, in accordance with the views of a majority of the parties attending, whether and when an additional review conference shall be convened.

23. Article VI of our draft treaty contains a withdrawal provision which is identical to that found in paragraph 1, article X of the non-proliferation treaty (ENDC/226*). This type of clause found its origin in a similar provision in the limited test ban Treaty (ENDC/100, Rev. 1).

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24. That completes the description of the operational clauses of the treaty. There will, of course, have to be some routine provisions dealing with the entering into force of the treaty, accessions, official languages, and so on. But if we can agree on the operational clauses -- and, after all, these are the clauses which have been under discussion and on which differences have appeared -- then the routine provisions should not be difficult and can be worked out at a later stage of the negotiations, once progress has been made towards agreement on the substantive treaty articles.

25. In conclusion, the United States delegation has repeatedly expressed its hope that this Committee can reach a satisfactory agreement which would prevent the nuclear arms race from spreading to the sea-bed. Likewise, we are convinced that such an agreement must be reached quickly, since it might be much more difficult, and perhaps not possible, to reach agreement once deployments had started. It is for these reasons that the draft treaty which we have submitted today does not attempt to solve all the problems at once. Rather it is designed to be a realistic and important first step towards more comprehensive disarmament. That is why we have included a provision that would subject the treaty to review and to possible amendment in the light of the experience gained in its operation and of technological developments which could bear on such issues as, for example, verification.

26. Finally, I should like to add that I believe the draft treaty we have submitted today provides a sound basis for negotiating a realistic and meaningful agreement -- one which will add a significant restraint to the nuclear arms race, and, at the same time, help to ensure that the resources of the sea-bed are used for the benefit of all countries.

27. Mr. CARACCILO (Italy) (translation from French): First of all, I should like to say that we listened with the greatest attention and keenest interest to the statement just made by the representative of the United States. I should like to assure him that my delegation will study very carefully the text which he has submitted (ENDC/249).

28. In my statement today I wish first to deal with the problem of the cessation of underground nuclear explosions. I have waited until the end of this session to expound to the Committee the Italian point of view on this question because I had hoped that the highly technical discussion which had been started on this subject between a number of delegations would provide us with new elements that might change our position.

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29. Unfortunately, the development of that discussion, which was highly interesting and constructive, has clearly shown that the crucial problem of verification and control is still the stumbling block in the way of the conclusion of an agreement. Nevertheless, a number of delegations have made a very effective contribution to the study of this problem. The Swedish delegation in particular has played -- if I may say so -- the part of a leader by enabling us to benefit from the results of the work of its scientists, by submitting a draft treaty (ENDC/242) which is very useful and also by taking the initiative for an informal meeting at which the Minister of State, Mrs. Myrdal, provided us with more complete explanations of her points of view. However, I believe that the general opinion is that we can hardly expect to reach an agreement on a total cessation of underground nuclear explosions before we have reached a compromise, acceptable to all delegations, on the problem of control.

30. Italy, for its part, cannot accept the principle that all possibilities of on-site control would be excluded. This position seems to us to be consistent with our status as a State signatory to the non-proliferation Treaty (ENDC/226*). In fact -- and may I in passing express a truism -- if the non-nuclear-weapon States had adopted a similar principle last year a treaty on non-proliferation would probably not have been concluded.

31. But one -- and not the least -- of the merits of the presentation of a draft treaty by the delegation of Sweden is to impel the other delegations, faced with precise proposals, to seek possible alternatives. I hope I am not mistaken in attributing this intention to the Swedish representative. The alternative, in our opinion, can be sought only in partial solutions designed to reduce the differences between the opposing theses.

32. From that point of view we appreciate especially the position taken by the representative of Canada (ENDC/PV.404, paras. 81 et. seq.). A more thorough study of the seismological data, that is to say, a study of their importance in order to obtain an effective international exchange in this field -- an idea which moreover is contemplated in article II of the Swedish draft treaty -- seems to us to constitute a step in the right direction. We therefore support the Canadian suggestion (ENDC/PV.404, para.87) to bring together a group of experts to consider the organization of such an international exchange and to report upon this subject. We also support the other Canadian idea (ibid., para.89), that various countries should draw up a list of all seismic stations from which they would be ready to supply records in the framework of a world-wide exchange of data.

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33. We also wish to express our appreciation of the proposal presented by the United States delegation on 5 December 1968 to the First Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations for international co-operation in seismic research by means of a series of nuclear explosions under the Plowshare programme, (A/C.1/PV.1630, provisional, pp.18-20). In this respect we would be grateful if the United States delegation, at a time which it felt to be most appropriate, would be good enough to let us know the practical measures it has in mind.

34. In August 1968 the Italian delegation presented to this Committee a working paper on underground nuclear explosions (ENDC/234). In that document we suggested that the regulation of underground explosions for peaceful purposes should provisionally be separated from the regulation of underground explosions of a purely military nature. This separation, in our opinion, had the advantage of facilitating an agreement on the control of military explosions -- at least until scientific and technological progress enabled the total control of all explosions to be guaranteed.

35. The fact that we have today reached a standstill on the subject of control seems to me to prove that our approach, aimed also at a partial agreement, can constitute a new point of departure for a useful discussion.

36. In any event, and even if a comprehensive agreement could be reached today on the prohibition of all nuclear explosions, it would be necessary to face the particular problem of allowing, that is to say of controlling, underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. There is no doubt -- and this is clearly indicated in article V of the non-proliferation Treaty -- that peaceful explosions must be allowed and must be carried out under strict international control in order to avoid the danger of any deviation from their original purpose. This international control must be exercised both if the nuclear States carried out such explosions on their own territory and if they carried them out on territory not their own at the request of a third State or an international organization.

37. Today we therefore wish to remind the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament of that suggestion contained in document ENDC/234. At the same time, and bearing in mind the opinions which have been expressed around this table as well as the events which have occurred in the meantime -- I am referring, of course, to the approval of the non-proliferation Treaty by the United Nations General Assembly -- we should like to suggest a slight change in our original proposal. In our working paper which I have already mentioned, we proposed that communications relating to the intention

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to carry out one or more nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes should be addressed to the United Nations. It seems to us today, bearing in mind also General Assembly resolution 2456 C (XXIII) (ENDC/237), that these communications should rather be addressed to an international service for explosions for peaceful purposes within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Similarly, the non-nuclear-weapon States mentioned in our original proposal could submit their lists of experts to the IAEA rather than to the governments of the States in which the explosion is to take place. For the sake of clarity I wanted to draw attention to this small change in a working document^{3/} -- which I shall ask the Secretariat of the Conference to be good enough to circulate -- representing mere modification of our previous working paper (ENDC/234).

38. We are convinced that our proposal would facilitate the establishment of international regulation of underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. We also think that it would enable scientists and technicians of the non-nuclear-weapon States to extend their knowledge of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Lastly, we think that the adoption of our proposal would be a first step towards the implementation of article V of the non-proliferation Treaty.

39. I should like now to dwell upon another point in our agenda (ENDC/236, p.3) -- namely, measures relating to the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes. We consider, in fact, that because of their political, military and psychological importance such measures deserve the utmost attention on the part of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. Moreover, we already expressed this conviction when our priorities for defining the programme of work of the Conference were put forward (ENDC/PV.385, paras 44 et seq.). At that time we noted with satisfaction (ibid., para.50) that a proposal for the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and for the reduction and elimination of stockpiles was included in the Soviet memorandum of 1 July 1968 (ENDC/227). Although the Soviet proposal was different in character from that aimed at ending the production of fissionable materials, we considered that it reflected the desire of the Soviet Union to undertake negotiations in this field and that it could consequently form the prelude to a more thorough study of this problem.

40. Subsequently, we took note with great interest of the statements made on 8 April by the representative of the United States on the problem of the "cut-off" (ENDC/PV.401, paras. 5-17). The fact that the United States Government has decided to renew and

^{3/} Circulated as document ENDC/250

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bring up to date the 1964 proposal (ENDC/134) must in our opinion be looked upon as an important and positive contribution to the work of the Conference in a field which is followed with particular attention by the militarily non-nuclear States. The point in the proposal made by Ambassador Fisher on 8 April which has particularly aroused our interest is the one relating to the application of controls. His new proposal in fact makes it possible to overcome the difficulty constituted by the criterion of mutual inspections which was at the basis of the previous United States proposal. It is thus a very substantial improvement for States which, not having installations for the production of fissionable material and consequently not having any counterpart to offer, would be practically excluded from any control mechanism whatsoever based on the criterion of reciprocity.

41. Moreover, this new United States proposal facilitates the implementation of the principle of universality of controls, a principle which we strongly supported during the negotiation of the non-proliferation Treaty. It is designed in fact to subject the nuclear countries, so far as their production of fissionable material is concerned, to the same controls by IAEA as the non-proliferation Treaty imposes on non-nuclear countries for their peaceful nuclear activities. The institution of those controls, which obviously would extend to the entire process of peaceful utilization of fissionable material produced in the future, would therefore be tantamount to the setting up of a single control system for the nuclear countries as well as for the non-nuclear countries. With all discrimination thus abolished, this measure would contribute, moreover, to increasing the effectiveness and even the duration of the non-proliferation Treaty.

42. We have noted that in his statement of 10 April (ENDC/PV.402, paras. 41 et seq.) the representative of the Soviet Union did not make any specific criticisms of the IAEA control system proposed by the United States delegation. With respect to the more general criticisms of the United States proposal that have been made I should merely like to point out that while it is true that the cessation of the production of fissionable material for military purposes would not lead to a reduction in the present stockpiles of nuclear weapons, this does not prove that the nuclear Powers must continue to increase indefinitely their production of fissionable material.

43. The cessation of the production of fissionable materials, especially if it went hand in hand with the making available for peaceful purposes of a part of the stockpile, would, in our opinion, be a very important first step towards the cessation of vertical proliferation and also of the production of nuclear weapons, which is called for by the

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Soviet memorandum. That first step therefore represents the prerequisite for the following step, and because it is designed to create an atmosphere of mutual confidence between the two major nuclear Powers it could not fail to reduce the danger of a nuclear conflict.

44. Lastly, and to revert to the idea to which I referred earlier, the measure in question would have the advantage of releasing for peaceful purposes substantial resources which are now used for military activities. The Italian delegation is particularly sensitive to that aspect of the United States proposal, which in some ways is connected with our own proposal of 1 August 1967 for making available part of the fissionable materials for peaceful purposes (ENDC/PV.318, paras. 15-21). I should like to add that the United States proposal could make control easier for the nuclear Powers themselves. Indeed it is obvious that once all production of fissionable material for military purposes had ceased, controls could be more easily accepted without fear of finding oneself exposed to the dangers of espionage in the fields of defence and national security.

In conclusion, it seems to us that the United States proposal could bring us substantially closer to the achievement of a certain uniformity of conditions between the nuclear Powers and the non-nuclear Powers. That is not the least of its merits.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 414th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Tomas Lahoda, representative of Czechoslovakia.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United States of America and Italy.

"The delegation of the United States of America submitted a draft treaty prohibiting the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and ocean floor (ENDC/249).

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Friday, 23 May, 1969, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 11.25 a.m.

